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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
with clean hands. In announcing that the legislature had
violated the public policy of the State, it seems that the
Court has not discriminated between the functions of the
legislative and judicial departments.
-MoSE EDWIN BOIARSKY.
FUTURE INTERESTS-A FEE LIMITED UPON A FEE BY DEED
-HEIR CONSTRUED AS HEIR OF THE BoDY.-The grantors by
deed granted land to their daughter Laura, with a limita-
tion that should Laura die without an heir, the land to be
equally divided between James and William, sons of the
grantors. After conveying to her sister, Laura died. The
heirs of James and William brought ejectment against the
sister. Held, the limitation over to James and William
was valid. Laura took a qualified fee determinable upon
her death without heirs of the body then living. Kidwell v.
Rogerg, 137 S. E. 5 (W. Va. 1927).
At early common-law a fee could not be limited upon a
,fee. The only kinds of future interests that could be cre-
ated were in the form of remainders, and any limitation
operating to shift the seisin otherwise than as a remainder
expectant upon the determination of the preceding estate
was void. This rule, the common-law doctrine of repug-
nancy between two estates, was founded upon the assump-
tion that the conveyance of the fee was the conveyance of
the Whole, and after the whole was given there was noth-
ing beyond that left to give. However, with the passage
of the statute of uses and the statute of wills, the possibili-
ties of the creation of future estates were greatly enlarged.
Limitations after a fee by way of springing and shifting
uses came to be recognized. Ulterior estates were per-
mitted to be created to arise upon the defeasance of prior
estates in the same property, contrary to the strict rules of
the early common-law. Pells v. Brown, 3 Cro. Jac. 590, in-
troduced into the law the novel idea of indestructible con-
tingent future interests. This nondestructibility of such
contingent future estates, created under the statute of uses,
led to the growth of a-new doctrine in the law of property,
the so-called rule against perpetuities. The English and
nearly all of the American authorities sustain the view of
Pells v. Brown, and also hold that a gift over upon a definite
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failure of issue is valid whether the gift is by will or deed.
Van Horn v. Campbell, 100 N. Y. 287, 3 N. E. 316; Harder v.
Matthews, 309 Ill. 548, 141 N. E. 422; 11 R. C. L. pp. 470-
4'71; 21" C. J. 1022-1025. The principal case is in accord
with the weight of authority and prior West Virginia deci-
sions. Ocheltree v. McClung, 7 W. Va. 232; Tomlinson v.
iVickell, 24 W. Va. 148; McKown.v. McKown, 93 W. Va. 689,
117 S. E. 557. The courts of this state are bound to up-
hold such limiting clauses not only by virtue of precedent,
but also by statutory directions. CODE, ch. 71, §§5 and 10.
The court in construing the word "heir" departed from the
strict common-law meaning. The rule is that "heir" will
be taken in its technical sense, as a word of limitation, and
the grantor wl1 be presumed to have so intended.
Reid v. Stuarti 13 W. Va. 346. If, in the principal case, the
court had construed "heir" in its technical sense, the
grantors would have said, "and should Laura die without
an heir at law, the land should be divided between John
and William, two of her heirs at law." In order to avoid
that absurdity and give effect to the intention of the grant-
ors as evidenced by the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, the court properly construed "heir" to mean
"heir of the body". Chipps v. Hall, 23 W. Va. 512; Tomlinson
v. Nickell, 24 W. Va. 148. This construction brings the case
within the operation of §10 of ch. 71, CODE, which renders
valid the limitation which would be otherwise invalid as
violative of the rule against perpetuities.
-Howard Caplan.
LIBEL - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS - COMMUNICA-
TIONS SENT TO COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER AFTER AWARD.
-- The plaintiff was receiving compensation from the West
Virginia State Compensation Commissioner for an injury
received in the defendant's mine. The defendant wrote a
letter to the State Compensation Commissioner which
caused this compensation to be cut off. The plaintiff brought
an action for libel alleging that because of false statements
in the letter the award had been set aside and not
reinstated until nine months later, thereby damaging plain-
tiff's good name and reputation. Held, demurrer to the
declaration sustained. In view of CODE, c. 15P, §40, giving
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